The withdrawal of water for irrigation in the dryer regions of Mexico already accounts for some 91% of potential availability. Further expansion of irrigated acreage, therefore, must rely more on increased water use efficiency rather than increased supply from engineering works. A prime instrument to bring about such an improvement could be an appropriate water pricing structure. The first three sections of the paper present the conceptual issues involved, as well as the empirical findings which show that irrigation farmers pay, on average, less than 10% of actual water costs. Water use efficiencies are shown to be less than 50% but are markedly higher in irrigation districts with volumetric compared to those with fixed water charges. The fourth section develops some representative pricing structures that are designed to account for both efficiency and income distributional goals, while the last one addresses some of the likely implementation problems.
I. Introduction
Economists have long maintained that an efficient utilization of water resources could be brought about by the application of the principle of equi-marginal value in use; this means that in any given watershed the value of the last unit of water utilized in all competing uses should be equal (12, 20, 23 )~ As other analysts have shown later, this principle can be extended, at least conceptually, to include non-monetary goals such as income distribution or environmental quality (4, 21, 32) .
This paper first provides a brief overview of the water problem in Mexico. This is followed by a discussion of the conceptual issues related to the pricing of water~ The third section discusses the results of an empirical investigation of irrigation water prices and irrigation water costs in public irrigation districts and projects. The fourth section reports the results of an analysis of estimated water use efficieneies in thirteen districts, and relates observed efficiencies to existing water pricing structures. The fifth section relates water costs to farmers' income and income-distributional objectives, and makes some *The authors are respectively, associate professor of resource economics, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (formerly World-Bank-UNDP economics Comlslon advisor, Plan National Hidraulico) and Vocal E]ecutivo, " " " Del Plan National Hidraulico, Mexico. The contents of this paper summarize the findings of a much larger study which is being published in Mexico (25). The objectives of Mexico's National Water Plan have been detailed in (18) . 15
suggestions how these objectives could be combined with efficiency considerations and appropriate tariff structures without sacrificing the important social goal of increasing the income of small-scale farmers. Finally, the last section briefly raises the difficult issues of implementing such pricing policies.
II. Problem Setting
Irrigation provides the productive backbone of Mexico's agricultural sector. In 1972/73, of a total of 16.8 million hectares (41.5 million acres) of harvested cropland, slightly less than 5 million (12.4 million acres) were irrigated (this includes double-cropping). While these 5 million represented only 35% of the total area harvested, they accounted for about 53 to 58% of the total value of output. Hence output from irrigated land is oa average 2.6 to 3.2 times higher per hectare than that from non-irrigated land (13).
If we eliminate the generally humid tropical lowlands of the country in which irrigation plays little or no role at all but which account for about 85 percent of total run-off, agricultural water withdrawal and consumption in the remaining regions, in 1970, amounted to 91% and 74% of total potential availability; for 1980 these percentages are estimated to reach 106 and 84 respectively. 1 Since these non-tropical, non-humid regions are precisely those which contain the majority of Mexico's non-agricultural population and industry as well, it is not surprising that water use conflicts and over-exploitation of aquifers are starting to plague many of them. 2
III. Water Pricing -Legal and Conceptual Bases
In Mexico the ownership of water rests unambiguously with the Fedezal Government, 3 and the pricing of water for any and all uses is a Federal responsibility. According to the 1972 Water Law, charges are to be levied against all users, whether they obtain water from a (Federally-financed) irrigation project 4 or simply obtained a concession for the use of certain quantities of water. 5 Even the federally owned Electricity Commission is required to pay for the use of water. 6 1Calculated from: (26) tables 3A and 3B. 2See also (17).
3
(9) p. 456.
4Ley Federal de Aguas, 1972, articles 68, 69~ 70, 71, 79, and 80. 51bid. Articles 114 and 134.
61bid., Article 106.
